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INDUSTRIAL COURTS
INDUSTRIAL COURTS
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE KANSAS EXPERIMENT'
By J. S. YOUNG*
T HE Kansas act creating a court of industrial relations has
been challenged as violating constitutional rights by (1)
affecting with a public interest the business of manufacturing
clothing and food, and the mining or production of fuel; (2)
socializing these three industries by providing for state operation
in certain circumstances; (3) interfering with liberty of contract
by denying to both employer and employee due process and
equal protection of the law; (4) reestablishing involuntary servi-
tude-; (5) impairing the obligation of the contract; (6) unnec-
essarily burdening interstate commerce. These are sweeping con-
demnations and call for an examination of the state police power
and the constitutional limitations that apply to it.
VI. THE KANSAS ACT AND THE POLICE POWER.
1. Nature and Methods of the Police Power. What is the
police power? The courts and writers on the subject frankly
acknowledge that the police power has never been more than
partially defined. Its nature prevents a concise definition. The
supreme court of Iowa has said that this power cannot be em-
balmed in any fixed or rigid formula and the Supreme Court of
the United States in the Slaughter House cases2 said:
"The police power is and must be, from its very nature inca-
pable of any very exact definition and limitation." Justice Shaw
in Commonwealth v. Alger3 pointed out that "it is much easier
to prescribe and realize the existence and sources of the police
power than to mark its boundaries or prescribe the limitations of
its existence." Various writers have made general statements
touching the nature of the police power. John Stuart Mill dis-
cussing the powers of the government said :4 "As soon as any
part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of
*Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
I Continued from 5 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 39.
2 (1872) 16 Wall. 36. 21 L. Ed. 394.
3 (1851) 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53, 58.
4 Essay on Liberty. Ch. 4, p. 283, Harvard Classics.
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others, society has jurisdiction over it." Professor Ernst Freund,
the most recent and undoubtedly the ablest writer on the police
power, after stating that the object of the police power is
the general welfare said:'
"It [the state] exercises its compulsory powers for tle pre-
vention and anticipation of wrong by narrowing common law
rights through conventional restraints and positive regulations
which are not confined to the prohibition of wrongful acts. It
is this latter kind of state control which constitutes the essence
of the police power. The maxim of this power is that every
individual must submit to such restraints in the exercise of his
liberty or of his rights of property as may be required to remove
or reduce the danger of the abuse of these rights on the part of
those who are unskillful, careless or unscrupulous."
The doctrine of the police power originated with and has
been developed by the courts until this power has come to have
a recognized place along with such powers of the state as the con-
stituent, the international, the administrative, the proprietary, the
criminal, the taxing and eminent domain; but the courts do not
attempt formal definitions. Each case is allowed to rest upon
its own individual merits. In Gibbons v. Ogden,6 Chief Justice
Marshall referred to the state police power, without using the
term, as the state's power to regulate its "internal affairs" whether
of "trading or police," and in Brozent v. Maryland,7 he used the
term "police power" for the first time in any adjudicated case.
In Lakeview v. Rose Hill Cemetery Company8 the supreme court
of Illinois, by Justice Scott, said:
"It [the police power] is a power coextensive with self-
preservation and is not inaptly termed the law of overruling
necessity. It may be said to be that inherent or plenary pov'er
in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society."
While the supreme court in the case of Thorpe v. Rutland,
etc., R. R. Co.9 described the police power as follows:
"It extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, com-
fort and quiet of all property within the state . . . and per-
sons and property are subject to all kinds of restraints and bur-
dens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity
of the state."
The courts have developed the police power until it now ex-
tends to the protection of public health, safety and morals; the
5 Freund, Ernst, Police Power, p. 6.
6 (1824) 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23.
7 (1827) 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 419, 6 L Ed. 678.
8 (1873) 70 Ill. 191, 22 Am. Rep. 71.
9 (1854) 27 Vt. 140, 149, 62 Am. Dec. 625.
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prevention of fraud; safeguarding against incapacity and incom-
petence; conservation of natural resources; securing public peace,
good order and comfort; promotion of public convenience, gen-
eral welfare and all the great public needs. The state cannot
divest itself of the police power.' In other words it is inalien-
able and is founded on the maxim, salus populi suprema lex est.
The general method of the police power is sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas. The state enforces this maxim by restraining and
regulating persons in the use they make of their liberty and
property. The police power is a general inherent power of the
American states; but it must be exercised in such manner as
not to conflict with the state or federal constitution. The
municipal corporations of a state may exercise the police power,
only, when it is properly delegated to them by the law-making
power of the state. The federal government has no general
police power but it may and does perform a similar function in
the exercise of its delegated powers over interstate commerce,
postal powers and taxation.
The state may exercise the police power when there is an
emergency, danger or need of such magnitude as amounts to
public rather than merely private welfare and the emergency
danger or need cannot be met more effectively by the exercise
of some other power. The police power legislation should be in
some proportion to the danger or need, should tend to remove
the danger or meet the need, and at the same time not impair
essential rights.
The police power is anticipatory and deals with incipient tend-
encies and conditions that unchecked may lead to the violation
of rights and the commission of crime. The exercise of this
salutary legislative power is closing the garage before the auto
is stolen'. If used wisely it may promote the general welfare
better than a resort to other coercive measures such as taxing,
eminent domain and the criminal power. The general spirit of
the times favors prevention rather than allowing matters to drift
until crime is committed and punishment must be inflicted; the
prevention of typhoid, smallpox, diphtheria and numerous other
contagious and infectious diseases by abolition of the slums and
the substitution of sanitary hygiene, drainage and sewage; the
prevention of accidents in the hazardous occupations rather than
10 See Boston Beer Co. v. Mass., (1877) 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. Ed. 989;
Stone v. Mississippi, (1879) 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. Ed. 1079.
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maiming workers and then providing compensation; the preven-
tion of vice by wholesome amusements, settlement houses and
proper home conditions; the prevention of food adulteration in-
stead of curing nation-wide poisoning and disease; the preven-
tion of fraud by proper licensing, inspection and publicity; the
prevention of social and economic injustice by wholesome legis-
lation. In short, the idea back of police power legislation is that
an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure; restraint and
regulation of persons in the use of their liberty and property are
better than reformation and punishment.
Has the Kansas legislature made a proper use of its reserve
police power in creating a court of industrial relations for the
settlement of industrial disputes, or has it, in seeking to serve
the public, exceeded constitutional limitations? In attempting
answers to this question the first subject that claims attention is
involved in affecting an industry or business with a public inter-
est; in the second is one of constitutional infringement.
2. Business Affected With a Public Interest. The Kansas
statute affects with a public interest the operation of (1) all pub-
lic utilities as defined in section 8329; (2) all common carriers
as defined in section 8330 of the General Statutes of Kansas,
1915; (3) the manufacture of clothing in common use by the
people of the state; (4) the manufacture of food products for
human beings; (5) the mining or production of fuel in common
use either for domestic, manufacturing or transportation pur-
poses; (6) "the transportation of all food products and articles
or substances entering into wearing apparel or fuel as afore-
said, from the place where produced to the place of manufac-
fure or consumption." This is one of the widest exercises of
the police power ever attempted by a state legislature. What is
mcant by affecting a business with a public interest? A review
of legislation and the resulting adjudications will afford the best
answer, and such a review will furnish an approximate standard
for testing the Kansas statute.
The doctrine of property or business affected with a public
interest was first definitely announced in this country by the
Supreme Court in the case of Munn v. Illinois" and has since
been reaffirmed in numerous statutes and adjudications. The
issue in the Munn case grew out of a provision in the constitu-
tion of Illinois, adopted in 1870, and legislation passed in pur-
11 (1876) 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77.
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suance thereof, that declared all elevators or storehouses where
grain or other property was stored for the public and a charge
made for such service, to be public warehouses and subject to
legislative control including the fixing of charges. The Supreme
Court upheld the validity of these constitutional and statutory
provisions as a proper exercise of the police power, the opinion
being written by Chief Justice Waite. The doctrine of the opin-
ion is founded on a statement made by Lord Chief Justice Hale
more than two hundred years ago in his treatise, De Portibus
Mars :12
"If the king"2 or subject have a public wharf unto which all
persons that come to that port must come and unlade or lade
their goods . . . because they are the wharfs only licensed
by the king . . . or because there is no other wharf in that
port, as it may fall out where a port is newly erected; in that
case there cannot be taken arbitrary or excessive duties for cran-
age, wharfage, etc., neither can they be enhanced to an immoder-
ate rate; but the duties must be reasonable and moderate.
* . . For now the wharf and crane and other conveniences are
affected with a public interest and they cease to be juris privati
only...."
Justice Waite stated Lord Hale's principle to be applicable
to this country as follows :14
"Property does become clothed with a public interest when
used in a manner to make it of public consequence and affect
the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his prop-
erty to a use in which the public has an interest, he in effect,
grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to
be controlled by the public for the common good to the extent
of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant
by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use
he must submit to the control."
Justice Waite then reviewed the general character of the busi-
ness of warehouse men in Chicago and emphasized the monop-
olistic nature of the business in the following words :15
"They stand . . . in the very 'gatevay of commerce' and
take toll from all who pass. Their business most certainly 'tends
to a common charge and is become a thing of public interest and
use.' . . . Certainly if any business can be clothed 'with a
public interest and cease to be juris privati only,' this has been."
Continuing, the court said:1 "It is difficult to see why, if the
12 1 Harg. Law Tracts, 78.
12 The King is placed on the same basis as a subject.
14The Munn case, (1876) 94 U. S. 113, 126, 24 L. Ed. 77.
25 (1876) 94 ,U. S. 113, 131-2, 24 L. Ed. 77.
18 (1876) 94 U. S. 113, 131, 24 L. Ed. 77.
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common carrier, or the miller, or the ferry-man, or the inn-keeper,
or the wharfinger, or the baker, or the cartman or the hackney-
coach man, pursues a public employment and exercises 'a sort
of public office,' these warehouse men do not."
Having established the business of warehousing to be clothed
with a public interest the court justified the fixing of maximum
charges for the service as follows :17
"In fact, the common law, which requires the charge to be
reasonable, is itself, a regulation as to price. Without it the
owner could make his rates at will, and compel the public to
yield to his terms or forego the use."
Justice Field, with Justice Strong concurring, filed a dissent-
ing opinion and raised the question whether it is within the com-
petency of the state to fix the compensation which an individual
may receive for the use of his own property in his private busi-
ness and for a service in connection with it, and remarked:1s
"There is no magic in the language, though used by a constitu-
tional convention, which can change a private business into a
public one, or alter the character of a building in which the
business is transacted. A tailor's or shoemaker's shop would still
retain its private character even though the assembled wisdom of
the state should declare by organic act or legislative ordinance
that such a place was a public workshop and that the workmen
were public tailors or public shoemakers. One might as well
attempt to change the nature of colors by giving them a new
designation."
Justice Field pointed out that by the doctrine of the majority
of the court all business and property in the state would be held
at the mercy of a majority in the legislature; that doing this under
the guise of public good or the police power would be the same
as doing it by a special act providing for the confiscation of pri-
vate property; that the legislature might fix the rent of all tene-
ments used as residences without reference to the cost of their
erection. He declared that when Lord Hale spoke of property
affected with a public interest and ceasing to be private he meant
property, the use of which had been granted by the government
or had been granted with special privileges. -He then stated that
the power to regulate charges under the police power in this
country rested on some right or privilege granted by the govern-
ment which renders the property more valuable to the owner;
that submission to the power of regulation grows out of the
17 (1876) 94 U. S. 113, 134, 24 L. Ed. 77.
18 (1876) 94 U. S. 113, 138, 24 L. Ed. 77.
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grant; that the moment the privilege or advantage is withdrawn
the power of regulation ceases.
The principles announced in the Munn case and other so-
called Granger cases came up again for a decision in two famous
cases, People v. Budd9 and Budd v. New York.20 In 1888 the
legislature of New York passed an act fixing the maximum
charge for receiving, elevating, weighing and discharging grain
between elevators and lake vessels or propellers, ocean vessels,
steamships, and canal boats. The constitutionality of the statute
was contested in the state court the following year. Judge An-
drews wrote the opinion of the court, and emphasized the fact
that the business of elevating grain is an incident to the business
of transportation, or that elevating is an instrumentality of trans-
portation; also that warehousing at Buffalo, New York City and
Brooklyn is a virtual monopoly which may be regulated under
the police power. In other words the doctrine of a business
affected with a public interest announced in the Munn case was
adopted by the state court. There were two vigorous dissents.
Justice Gray when discussing the question of virtual monopoly
said :1
"Has the government any concern or interest in the price
which one individual may demand of another, who resorts to him
because of his superior business skill or facilities? How does
the magnitude or the publicity of an individual's business fur-
nish a valid reason for legislative interference? Every business
is, in a measure, public, and is dependent upon the public patron-
age for its maintenance and success. It is not compulsory upon
the public to resort to these elevators nor is the business exclu-
sive or beyond competition. . . . If the door is opened to
this species of legislation what protection have we against social-
istic laws? The police power is incapable of being stretched to
reach such a case as this if we have any respect for the pro-
visions of the constitution. Its justification for interference with
a private, legitimate business is admissible only when that busi-
ness may be said to be affected by a public use or interest by
reason of some grant or privilege conferred by the state."
A second dissenting opinion was filed by Justice Peckham who
said :22
19 (1889) 117 N. Y. 1, 22 N. E. 670, 682, 5 L. R. A. 559, 15 A. S. R. 460.20 (1891) 143 U. S. 517, 36 L. Ed. 247, 12 S. C. R. 468.
21 People v. Budd, (1889) 117 N. Y. 1, 32, 22 N. E. 670, 682, 5 L. R. A.
559, 15 A. S. R. 460.
22 (1889) 117 N. Y. 1, 40, 22 N. E. 670, 682, 5 L. R. A. 559, 15 A. S. R.
460.
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"I also deny that any person has a virtual or any monopoly
in the business, without a grant thereof from the sovereign power
merely because the property is conveniently situated for the busi-
ness and it would cost a large amount of money to duplicate it.
So long as everybody is free to go into the same business and
invest his capital therein with the same rights and privileges as
those who are already engaged in it, there can be no monopoly
in the legal acceptation of the term, virtual or otherwise."
Justice Peckham then protested against adopting the view of
Lord Hale which, he said, undoubtedly was colored by the atmos-
phere of his times with their paternalistic conceptions of govern-
ment, and then enlarging and extending this view to other cases
and by so doing ignoring the later and truer conceptions whikch
an advancing civilization and fuller knowledge of political econ-
omy marks out as the proper functions of government. The case
was appealed to the Supreme Court.23 Justice Blatchford wrote
the opinion and followed the same line of reasoning adopted by
Justice Waite in the Munn case and by Justice Andrews in the
Budd case. Again there was a vigorous dissent written by Jus-
tice Brewer with Justices Field and Brown concurring. Justice
Brewer said 24 the vice of the doctrine announced in the opinion
of the court is "that it places a public interest in the use of prop-
erty upon the same basis as a public use of property." Continu-
ing he said:
"Property is devoted to a public use, when, and only when the
use is one which the public in its organized capacity, to-wit, the
state, has a right to create and maintain it, and, therefore, one
which all the public have a right to demand and share in. -The
use is public, because the public may create it, and that individ-
ual creating it is doing thereby and pro tanto the work of the
state. The creation of all highways is a public duty. Railroads
are highways. The state may build them. If an individual does
that work he is pro tanto doing the work of the state. He de-
votes his property to a public use. The state doing the work
fixes the price for the use. . . . But this public use is very
different from a public interest in the use. There is scarcely any
property in whose use the public has no interest. No man liveth
unto himself alone, and no man's property is beyond the touch
of another's welfare. Everything, the manner and extent of
whose use affects the well-being of others, is property in whose
use the public has an interest. . . . Take for instance the
only store in a little village, all the public of that village are
23 Budd v. New York, (1891) 143 U. S. 517, 36 L. Ed. 247, 12 S. C. R.
468.
24 (1891) 143 U. S. 517, 549-550, 36 L. Ed. 247, 12 S. C. R. 468.
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interested in its use. . . . That which is true of the small
village store is also true of the largest mercantile establishment
in the great city. The magnitude of business does not change
the principle. Surely the matters in which the public has the
most interest are the supplies of food and clothing; yet can it
be that by reason of this interest the state may fix the price at
which the butcher must sell his meat or the vendor of boots and
shoes his goods ?"
The judge then made an analysis of warehousing and con-
cluded that the business is private, not public, therefore, the state
cannot regulate it under the police power. He then set forth the
following rule:
"That property which a man has honestly acquired, he re-
tains full control of subject to the following limitations: First
that he shall not use it to his neighbor's injury, and that does
not mean that he must use it for his neighbor's benefit; second,
that if he devotes it to a public use he gives to the public a right
to control that use; and third, that whenever the public need
requires, the public may take it upon payment of due compen-
sation."
In 1891 the state of North Dakota regulated grain elevators,
declaring them to be public warehouses, fixed charges, and re-
quired their managers to carry insurance to protect the owners of
grain stored in such elevators. This act was contested before
the Supreme Court in the case of Brass v. North Dakota.2  The
opinion of the court was written by Justice Shiras, who pointed
out that the monopoly feature of the warehouse business upon
which the Munn and Budd cases rested is not conclusive in the
matter of regulation, nor does the power of regulation rest ex-
clusively upon special privileges granted. In other words, Jus-
tice Shiras stripped the principle of its monopolistic and special
privilege features and said:
"When it is once admitted, as it is admitted here, that it is
competent for the legislative power to control the business of
elevating and storing grain, whether carried on by individuals or
associations, in cities of one size and in some circumstances, it
follows that such power may be legally exerted over the same
business when carried on in smaller cities and in other circum-
stances. We do not understand this law to require the owner of
a warehouse built and used by him only to store his own grain
to receive and store the grain of others. Such a duty only arises
when he chooses to enter upon the business of elevating and stor-
ing the grain of others for profit."
25 (1894) 153 U. S. 391, 38 L. Ed. 757, 14 S. C. R. 857.
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Again Justice Brewer, Justices Field, Jackson and White con-
curring, dissented. Justice Brewer offered three objections
against the opinion :26 (1) the warehouse man by the decision
is compelled to engage in the business of maintaining a public
warehouse when his chief interest is private, or buying, storing
and selling grain for himself, the storing for the public being only
incidental; (2) there is no practical monopoly in the prairie state
of North Dakota by means of which tribute can be exacted from
the community, as was involved in the Munn and Budd cases;
(3) the warehouse man is compelled to insure grain for the bene-
fit of those storing it no matter what the cost.
The above review shows that the business of warehousing has
been established as one affected with a public interest, and hence
subject to the exercise of the police power, in spite of the power-
ful arguments advanced in able dissenting opinions bottomed on
the private nature of the business. In other words, such a public
interest was discovered by the legislatures as justified state
control.
A development somewhat similar to that of warehousing,. has
taken place with regard to banking. There was little regulation
of banking in English law. There was some statutory regula-
tion of dealing in coins, bills of exchange and fixing the rate of
interest. In the United States, banking was originally regarded
as a common right and open to all citizens until after the finan-
cial crisis of 1837. when some states passed statutes changing the
common law right in order to insure financial security.27  These
general regulations culminated in limiting the right of banking
to corporations in some states and compelling the creation of a
depositors' guaranty fund in other states. In 1890 the state of
North Dakota passed an act prohibiting private banking and re-
quired all banking to be carried on by corporations. In uphold-
ing this act as a proper exercise of the police power the supreme
court of North Dakota in the case of State ex', rel. Goodsil v.
Woodmausee,28 by Justice Wallin, said:
"It is clear . . . that the matter of regulating and pro-
hibiting private banking, and all banking not expressly author-
ized by law, is strictly within the legislative discretion, under
26 (1894) 153 U. S. 291, 308, 38 L. Ed. 757, 14 S. C. R. 857.
27 Freund, Police Power 417.
28 (1890) 1 N. D. 246, 46 N. W. 970; accord Weed v. Bergh, (1910)
141 Wis. 569, 124 N. W. 664; 'Contra, State v. Scougral, (1892) 3 S. D.
55, 51 N. W. 858, and Marymont v. Nevada State B nking Board, (1910)
33 Nev. 333, 111 Pac. 295.
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that branch of the police power relating to the public safety and
that the courts will not interfere and declare such legislation un-
constitutional as an invasion of natural rights."
Closely connected with the requirement that all banking be
done by corporations is one adopted by the Kansas legislature in
1911, authorizing a state charter board to decide whether public
business necessity in a community justifies the establishment of a
bank or of additional banking facilities, and if no public neces-
sity is found, to withhold a charter from the would-be-incorpora-
tors. In upholding the constitutionality of the act, the supreme
court of Kansas in the case of Schaake v. Dolley,29 by Justice
Burch said:
"What'the common law rights of the plaintiff may have been
is not very material. . . . Numerous subjects which for-
merly were chiefly .private with only an incidental public aspect,
have become social subjects demanding regulation of a kind and
to an extent which former conditions did not warrant. Thebusiness of banking is now clearly discriminated as belonging to
that class."
In 1907 and 1909 the state of Oklahoma passed acts subject-
ing state banks to assessments for a depositors' guaranty fund.
In upholding the constitutionality of the act the Supreme Court
in Noble State Bank v. Haskell0 said:
"It may be said in a general way that the police power ex-
tends to all the great public needs. . . . It may be put forthin aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing
morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and
immediately necessary to the public welfare."
On a motion for a re-hearing of this case, counsel for the Nobel
State Bank vainly pointed out that the doctrine of the decision
substitutes public opinion for the constitution.31
Insurance has been regulated for practically the same rea-
sons as justify regulation of banking. The first general regula-
tion was in the state of New York in 1849. Now most states
have elaborate regulations. 32  In 1870 the state of Pennsylvania
passed an act which restricted fire insurance to corporations. In
upholding the constitutionality of the act the supreme court of
209 (1911) 85 Kan. 598, 118 Pac. 80.30 (1911) 219 U. S. 104, 55 L. Ed. 112, 31 S. C. R. 186. Accord Assaria
State Bank v. Dolley, (1911) 219 U. S. 121, 55 L. Ed. 112, 31 S. C. R.186; Shallenburger v. First State Bank, (1911) 219 U. S. 114, 55 L. Ed.112, 31 S. C. R. 186.
31 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, (1911) 219 U. S. 575, 55 L. Ed. 341,
31 S. C. R. 299.
32 Freund, Police Power, 418.
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Pennsylvania in the case of Comnmonwealth v. Vrooinai,
3  by
Justice Williams, said:
"The business of insurance against loss by fire is, by reason
of its magnitude, its importance to property owners, and the
nature of the business, a proper subject for the exercise of the
police power of the state. The act of 1870 . . . does not
prohibit but regulates the subject. .. The qualification is
reasonable."
Justice Dean, Chief Justice Sterrett and Justice Green concur-
ring, dissented and among other things said :34
"It is paternalism to assume that citizens are incapable of
prudently contracting with reference to their property without an
express grant of the state in the shape of a corporate franchise,
to one of the contracting parties. It is an assumption that the
citizen is a child, needing the tutelage and protection of the leg-
islature in the ordinary affairs of business life. Or else it is a
species of tyranny in government, like that of Turkey where the
right to produce, manufacture and trade are all the subject of
grant from the Sultan."
A further step in regulating fire insurance was taken by Kansas
in 1909 by regulation of rates under the supervision of the super-
intendent of insurance with the right of review by the district
court. In upholding the constitutionality of this act Justice. I'Ic-
Kenna in the case of German Alliance Insurance'Co. v. Lewis
said:
"The basic contention is that the business of insurance is a
natural right receiving no privilege from the state, is voluntarily
entered into, cannot be compelled nor can any of its exercises be
compelled; that it concerns personal contracts of indemnity
against certain contingencies. Whether such contracts shall be
made at all it is contended is a matter of private regulation and
agreement, and necessarily there must be freedom in fixing the
terms. And 'where the right to demand and receive service does
not exist in the public, the correlative right of regulation as to
rates and charges does not exist.' ,,31
This the Justice put aside as adventitious and inquired:
"Is the business of insurance so far affected with public inter-
est as to justify legislative regulation of its rates? And we mean
a broad and definite public interest. In some degree the public
interest is involved in every transaction between men, the sum of
the transactions constituting the activities of life. But there is
something more special than this, something of more definite con-
33 (1894) 164 Pa. 306, 30 AtI. 217, 25 L. R. A. 250.
34 (1894) 164 Pa. 306, 325, 30 At. 217, 25 L. R. A. 250.
35 (1913) 233 U. S. 389, 58 L. Ed. 1011, 34 S. C. R. 612.
36 (1913) 233 U. S. 389, 405, 58 L. Ed. 1011, 34 S. C. R. 612.
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sequence, which makes the public interest that justifies regulatory
legislation."
This more special interest he found, in such matters as the busi-
ness of common carriers, the transmission of intelligence, the fur-
nishing of water, light, gas and electricity, and then said:
"We do not hesitate at their regulation nor at the fixing of the
prices which may be charged for their service. The basis of the
ready concession of the power of regulation is the public inter-
est.
37
He dismissed as artificial the contention that the service which
the state cannot demand is not subject to state regulation; also
the contention that regulation applies to personal property, only,
and not to personal contracts. Touching the latter point he said:
"It is the business that is the fundamental thing; property is but
its instrument, the means of rendering the service which has be-
come of public interest."
Referring to Justice Brewer's dissent in the Budd case, he said:
"Every consideration was adduced based on the private char-
acter of the business regulated, and for that reason, its consti-
tutional immunity from regulation, with all the power of argu-
ment and illustration of which that great judge was a master.
The considerations did not prevail. Against them the court op-
posed the ever-existing police power in government and its nec-
essary exercise for the public good. . ....
He chided the timid and halting in the following words:
"Against that conservatism of mind which puts to question every
new act of regulating legislation and regards the legislation in-
valid or dangerous until it has become familiar, government-
state and national-has pressed on in the general welfare. ...
The dread of the moment having passed, no one is now heard to
say that rights were restrained or their constitutional guaran-
tees impaired.""3
The Justice examined the business of fire insurance in the
light of the Munn, Budd and Brass cases and said:
"Business, by circumstances and its nature, may rise from private
to be of public concern and be subject in consequence to govern-
mental regulations. Contracts of insurance have greater public
consequence than contracts between individuals to do or not to
do a particular thing whose effects stop with the individuals.
. . .When the effect goes beyond that there are many exam-
ples of regulation."3 9
Justice Lamar, Chief Justice White, and Justice Van De-
vanter concurring, wrote a vigorous dissent that compares favor-
37 (1913) 233 U. S. 389, 407, 58 L. Ed. 1011, 34 S. C. R. 612.
38 (1913) 233 U. S. 389, 409, 58 L. Ed. 1011, 34 S. C. R. 612.
39 (1913) 233 U. S. 389, 413, 58 L. Ed. 1011, 34 S. C. R. 612.
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ably with the dissents set out above. Among other things he said:
"For if the power to regulate, in the interest of the public, com-
prehends what is intended in the power to take property for a
public use, it must inevitably follow that the price to be paid for
any service or the use of any property can be regulated by the
general assembly.
' 40
He then examined laws regulating such business as canals,
waterways and booms; bridges and ferries; wharves, docks, ele-
vators and stockyards; telegraph, telephone, electric, gas and oil
lines; turnpikes, railroads and the various forms of common
carriers including express and cabs; inn-keeping, irrigation
ditches and toll mills, and called attention to the fact that in each
instance the power to regulate rates is applied to a business that
uses tangible property devoted to a public use, not intangible such
as an insurance contract.41  He finally pointed out that public
interest and public use are not synonymous; if they are synony-
mous, then the sum of the units involved in farming and labor
clothe these occupations with a public interest and the price of
farm products and wages of the day laborer can be minutely reg-
ulated as they were during England's paternalistic regime be-
tween the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries.
42
The police power in its narrow sense of restraining and regu-
lating in the interest of peace, safety, health and morals applies
to all business; but a special kind of control applies to a public
business or one affected with a public interest. At common law
these businesses are the ones conducted by an inn-keeper, ferry-
man, wharfinger, miller, and common carrier; in addition, by
statute, the business of railroads, telegraphs, telephones, turn-
pikes, canals, warehouses, stockyards; the supplying of water,
gas, light, heat, oils, and power through pipes and wires; banking
and insurance, and the distribution of news and market quota-
tions. These have to do with transportation, finance and the nec-
essaries of life.43 In other words, their justification for restraint
and regulation is that business has (1) a government grant or
special privilege; (2) is a virtual monopoly although not con-
clusive now; (3) such a business has standardized its methods so
that the public must use it for success; (4) where the business is
that of caring for another's property or money.44
40 (1913) 233 U. S. 389, 419, 58 L. Ed. 1011, 34 S. C. R. 612.
41 (1913) 233 U. S. 389, 426, 58 L. Ed. 1011, 34 S. C. R. 612.
42 (1913) 233 U. S. 389, 430, 58 L. Ed. 1011, 34 S. C. R. 612.
43 Freund, Police Power 381.
446 R. C. L. 227.
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Was the Kansas legislature justified in affecting with a pub-
lic interest the occupations mentioned above? An affirmative
answer can be given with assurance touching the public utilities
and common carriers. The manufacture of food and clothing and
the mining and preparation of fuel present a more difficult ques-
tion. The leading cases reviewed above were presented to show
the progressive advance made in this country by law-makers and
courts in spite of powerful dissents based upon the private nature
of the business. No more cogent reasoning or vigorous language
can be used against affecting with a public interest the manufac-
ture of three great necessities of life-food, clothing and fuel
and the transportation of the same-than were used by Justices
Field, Brewer, Gray, Peckham, Dean and Lamar; but the police
power legislation was upheld in each case. Every great advance,
both in common and statutory law, arose out of some public
necessity. There are always persons, especially those who fear
their interests are adversely affected, who think nothing is con-
stitutional until some court of last resort says so. Courageous
spirits in the Kansas legislature have adventured a little farther
than preceding legislatures and applied the police power to new
economic areas by affecting three fundamental necessaries of life
with a public interest and applying government regulations. Will
the courts of last resort uphold this new legislation as a proper
exercise of the police power? The judicial answer to this question
depends on whether the Kansas act has gone so far as to infringe
the constitutional limitations. justice Holmes stated the method
of fixing the scope of the police power and how it is determined
as follows:
"With regard to the police power, as elsewhere in the law, lines
are pricked out by the gradual approach and contact of decisions
on the opposing sides." 45
VII. THE KANSAS ACT AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
In order to run the gauntlet of constitutional limitations, the
Kansas statute must have been enacted in the face of a great
emergency or danger, or to promote some great public need and
tend to overcome the emergency or danger and conserve the pub-
lic interest in a reasonably effective manner. If under' judicial
test the act is found to be capricious, unreasonable or arbitrary,
4" Noble State Bank v. Haskell, (1911) 219 U .S. 104, 11Z, 55 L. Ed.
112, 31 S. C. R. 186.
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it will be declared unconstitutional. The act must have some re-
lation of means to a legitimate public end.
I. Liberty of Contract. The chief constitutional provisions
used t6 restrain the legislative exercise of the police power are
found in the bill of rights, in state constitutions, and the four-
teenth amendment to the federal constitution. The pertinent parts
of the Kansas bill of rights read :41 "All men are possessed of
equal and inalienable natural rights, among which are life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness ;" also, "all persons for injuries suf-
fered in person, reputation or property, shall have remedy by due
course of law and justice administered without delay." The pert-
inint part of the fourteenth amendment reads :17 "Nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." The Kansas act has been
attacked as infringing these provisions. What is meant by "lib-
erty," "propdrty," "due process," and "equal protection" as used
in the constitutions? The meaning of these words when em-
ployed by the courts indicate a fusing or overlapping. The Su-
preme Court in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,-8 by Justice Peckham, said:
"The liberty mentioned in the fourteenth amendment means
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical
restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed
to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the engagement of
all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live
and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful call-
ing; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose
to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and
essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the pur-
poses above mentioned."
Property as defined by the supreme court of Illinois in Braceville
Coal Co. v. People,4" by Justice Shope,
"Is the right, not only to possess and enjoy it, but also to acquire
it in any lawful mode, or by following any lawful industrial pur-
suit which the citizen, in the exercise of the liberty guaranteed,
may choose to adopt. Labor is the primary foundation of all
wealth. The property which one has in his own labor is the com-
mon heritage, and, as an incident to the right to acquire other
property, the liberty to enter into contracts by which labor may be
employed in such way as the laborer shall deem most beneficial,
46 Kansas constitution, bill of rights, secs. 1 and 18.
47 Constitution of I. S., fourteenth amendment, sec. 1.
48 (1897) 165 U. S. 578, 17 S. C. R. 427, 41 L. Ed. 832.
49 (1893) 147 Ill. 66, 35 N. E. 62, 22 L. R. A. 340, 37 A. S. R. 206.
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and of others to employ such labor, is necessarily included in the
constitutional guarantee."
These definitions indicate that the "due process" clause includes
contractual rights as a species of liberty and property. Further-
more, "equal protection" usually accompanies or is included in
"due process." In support of this statement the Supreme Court
in Sinyth v. Avies,50 by Justice Harlan, said:
"A state law establishing rates for transportation of persons
or property by railroad that will not admit of the carrier earning
such compensation as under the circumstances, is just to it and
to the public, would deprive such carrier of its property without
'due process' of law and deny to it the equal protection of
the law."
The state does not violate the "equal protection" clause if its laws
operate on all alike without imposing any arbitrary power of
government on the individual. Of course, all persons do not have
to be treated alike. The legislature may make classifications on
the basis of necessity or convenience; but the laws must operate
uniformly within the classification. Justice Field gave a good
general statement on the nature of "equal protection" in the case
of Barbier v. Counoly '1 in the following words:
"The fourteenth amendment in declaring that no state shall
deprive any. person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the law, undoubtedly intended, not only that there
should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty or arbitrary
spoliation of property but that equal protection and security should
be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their
personal and civil rights; that all persons should be equally entitled
to pursue their happiness and acquire and enjoy property; that
they should have like access to the courts of the country for the
protection of their persons and property, the prevention and re-
dress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts; that no im-
pediment should be imposed to the pursuits of anyone except as
applied to the same pursuits by others under like circumstances;
that no greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon
others in the same calling and condition. . . . But neither
the amendment, broad and comprehensive as it is, nor any other
amendment was designed to interfere with the power of the state,
sometimes termed its 'police power,' to prescribe regulations, to
promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of
the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the
state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity."
5o (1898) 169 U. S. 466, 18 S. C. R. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819.
51 (1885) 113 U. S. 27, 5 S. C. R. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923.
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The chief assault on the Kansas act has been directed against
its contract provisions by counsel for defense in the Howat case
before the Crawford County district court 52 and the Kansas su-
preme court.53 In these cases the issue was whether the coal-
mining business is one that can be affected with a public interest
and consequently be regulated under the police power. The most
obnoxious provisions of the Kansas act, according to Howat's
counsel are section 9 which provides that if in any of the indus-
tries affected with a public interest, the contract entered into in
the future for their operation be found to be unfair, unjust or
unreasonable, the court of industrial relations has the power to
modify the contract so it will be fair, just and reasonable; section
15, which makes it unlawful to discharge or discriminate against
an employee for any testimony before, or any complaint made to
the court of industrial relations, touching a controversy between
employers and employees; section 17 which makes it unlawful
for any employee or other person willfully to strike, or picket any
of the specified industries, etc., for the purpose of hindering, de-
laying, interfering with, or suspending their operation.
Mr. J. T. Clarkson, one of the counsel for Howat in the case
before the Crawford County district court presented a brief which
traces the history of labor in England, beginning with the Statute
of Labourers of 1349 which required all able-bodied men to
work, fixed wages, etc., cited cases54 both English and American
which upheld the common law right to indict and convict laborers
for a conspiracy to raise wages; asserted that to protect liberty,
and prevent interference with the freedom of contract the four-
teenth amendment was adopted; developed the modern doctrine
of the right of workmen to combine or form labor unions ;55 set
out the rights of individual members of a labor union;56 devel-
oped the theory that the best method of making a labor union
52Kansas v. Howat, et al., (1920) Crawford County Dist. Court,
printed transcript; Typewritten brief of John T. Clarkson, Albia, Iowa.
53 Kansas v. Howat et al., (1920) 107 Kan. 423, 191 Pac. 585.
54Rex v. Journeyman Tailors, (1721) 8 Mod. 10; People v. Melvin,
(1810) 2 Wheeler's C. C. (N.Y.) 202; Yates Ill. Cas. 112; People v.
Trequier, (1823) 1 Wheeler's C. C. (N.Y.) 142.
55 See Martin, Modern Law of Labor Unions 9. See Commonwealth
v. Hurt, (1842) 4 Metc. (Mass.) 111, 38 Am. Dec. 346; Pickett v. Walsh,
(1905) 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753; Jacobs v. Cohen, (1905) 183 N. Y.
207, 76 N. E. 5, 111 A. S. R. 730, 2 L. R. A. (N.S.) 292.
56 See State v. Glidden, (1887) 55 Conn. 46, 2 A. S. R. 231 , Karges
Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local Union, (1905) 165
Ind. 42, 75 N. E. 877, 2 L. R. A. (N.S.) 607; My Maryland Lodge v.
Adt. (1905) 100 Md. 238, 59 Atl. 721, 68 L. R. A. 752.
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effective is by the use of strikes which he declared permissible as
a part of the liberty of contract, regardless of the motives for
which the strike is called and said:
"Thus it is clear that one in the employ of another, under a
contract terminable at will, or where the contract will terminate
at a given time, has an absolute right to determine for himself, or
agree with others at the termination of that contract, or at any
time if terminable at will, to quit the employment and his motive
for so doing is beyond inquiry.
'6 7
In support of this position counsel for Howat relied on certain
decisions58 of the Kansas supreme court, but chiefly on a few
leading decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, up-
holding the freedom of contract. In Brick Company v. Perry 9
where the Kansas supreme court had under consideration a statute
making it unlawful to discharge an employee because he belongs
to a labor organization the industry not being affected with a
public interest; Judge Greene pronounced the act unconstitutional
and among other things said:
"The right to follow any lawful vocation and to make con-
tracts is as completely within the protection of the constitution as
the right to hold property free from unwarranted seizure or the
liberty to go when and where one will. One of the ways of obtain-
ing property is by contract. The right, therefore, to contract can-
not be infringed by the legislature as it would be violating the
letter and spirit of the constitution. Every person is protected in
his right to work where and for whom he will. He may select
not only his employer but also his associates. Any act of the
legislature that would undertake to impose on any employer the
obligation of keeping in his service one whom, for any reason, he
should not desire, would be a denial of his constitutional rights
to make and terminate contracts and to acquire and hold prop-
erty ....
In the case of Adair v. United States" the Supreme Court
had under consideration an act of Congress regulating interstate
commerce, one section of which made it a crime for an agent of
an interstate carrier, with full authority on the premises, to dis-
5 Hichman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, (1917) 229 U. S. 245. 259;
Purvis v. U. B. of Carpenters and Joiners, (1906) 214 Pa. 348, 63 Atl.
585, 112 A. S. R. 272. 12 L. R. A. 642; Beechley v. Melville, (1897) 102
Iowa 602, 70 N. W. 107; Kimball v. Harrison, (1871) 34 Md. 407.
s See State v. Haun, (1899) 61 Kan. 146, 59 Pac. 340; State v. Wil-
son, (1899) 61 Kan. 32, 58 Pac. 981, especially Judge Smith's dissent;
Coffeyville Vitrified Brick and Tile Co. v. Perry, (1904) 69 Kan. 297, 76
Pac. 848.
5 Coffeyville Vitrified Brick and Tile Co. v. Perry, (1904) 69 Kan.
297, 76 Pac. 848.
60 (1908) 208 U. S. 161, 52 L. Ed. 436, 28 S. C. R. 277.
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charge an employee simply because of belonging to a labor union.
Justice Harlan in declaring the act unconstitutional, said:
"In our opinion that section, in the particular mentioned, is an in-
vasion of personal liberty, as well as the right of property guaran-
teed by that amendment6 ' [the fifth]. . . . Such liberty and
right embraces the right to make contracts for the purchase of the
labor of others, and equally the right to make contracts for the
sale of one's own labor. . . . It is not within the functions
of government-at least in the absence of contract between the
parties-to compel anyone in the course of his business and against
his will to accept or retain the personal service of another or to
compel any person against their will to perform personal services
for another. The rights of persons to sell their labor upon such
terms as they deem proper is, in its essence, the same as the right
of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which
he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it. So
the right of the employee to quit the service of the employer for
whatever reason is the same as the right of the employer for
whatever reason to dispense with the services of such employee." 2
Another leading case is Coppage v. Kansas"3 in which the
Supreme Court had under consideration an act of Kansas which
made it a crime for anyone to coerce another to make any agree-
ment not to join, become or remain a member of a labor organiza-
tion. The court, by Justice Pitney, held the statute contrary to the
'due process' clause of the fourteenth amendment and referring
to the Adair case said:
"Unless it be overruled, this decision is controlling upon the
present controversy; for if Congress is prevented from arbitrary
interference with the liberty of contract because of the 'due
process' provision of the fifth amendment, it is too clear for argu-
ment that the states are prevented from the like interference by
virtue of the corresponding clause of the fourteenth amendment;
and hence if it be unconstitutional for Congress to deprive an
employer of liberty or property for threatening an employee with
loss of employment or discriminating against him because of his
membership in a labor organization, it is unconstitutional for a
state to similarly punish an employer for requiring his employee
as a condition for securing and retaining employment to agree
not to become or remain a member of such an organization while
so employed."
Justices Holmes, Day and Hughes dissented.
61 It will be observed that the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments are identical-the fifth applies to acts of Con-
gress; while the fourteenth applies to the lawmaking power of each state.
62 Justices McKenna and Holmes filed separate dissenting opinions.
Infra.
63 (1914) 236 U. S. 1, 59 L. Ed. 441, 35 S. C. R. 240.
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The proponents of the parts of the Kansas act that deal with
contracts rest their case on a somewhat different conception of
contracts and the "due process" clauses of the constitutions. They
rely on such statements of the supreme court, " . . . free-
dom of contract is a qualified and not an absolute right. There is
no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one
chooses. . . . Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary re-
straint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibi-
tions imposed in the interest of the community; ' '64 also, "it is
within the undoubted power of government to restrain some indi-
viduals from all contracts, as well as all individuals from some
contracts."6 5
The courts of last resort have recognized that liberty to con-
tract is limited and not absolute, by upholding statutes fixing a
reasonable maximum charge for a public servicer;6 prohibiting
the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors ;67 limiting the
hours of employment in mines and smelters;cs prescribing the
hours of labor for those employed by the state or its municipali-
ties ;69 prohibiting the sale of cigarettes without a license ;70 abol-
ishing the 'truck system' and requiring payment of wages in
cash ;71 prohibiting option contracts to sell or buy grain ;72 restrict-
ing the hours that women may be employed in laundries to not
more than ten hours a day ;73 permitting a person to condemn
property for the purpose of obtaining water for his land ;74 mak-
64 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. McGuire, (1911) 219 U. S. 549, 55 L. Ed. 328,
31 S. C. R. 259. See Crowley v. Christensen, (1890) 137 U. S. 86, 34
L. Ed. 605, 11 S. C. R. 13, and Jacobson v. Massachusetts, (1901) 197
U. S. 11, 49 L. Ed. 643, 25 S. C. R. 358.
65 Frisbie v. United States, (1895) 157 U. S. 160, 39 L. Ed. 657, 15
S. C. R. 586.
66 Munn v. Illinois, supra; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Iowa, (1876) 94
U. S. 155, 24 L. Ed. 94; Railroad Commission cases. (1886) 116 U. S.
307, 29 L. Ed. 636; Wilson v. Consolidated Gas Co., (1908) 212 U. S. 19,
53 L. Ed. 382, 29 S. C. R. 192.
67 Mugler v. Kansas, (1903) 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. Ed. 205. 8 S. C. R. 273.
68 Holden v. Hardy, (1897) 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. Ed. 780, 18 S. C. R.
383.
69 Atkln v. Kansas, (1903) 191 U. S. 207, 48 L. Ed. 148, 24 S. C. R.
124.
70 Gundling v. Chicago, (1900) 177 U. S. 183, 44 L. Ed. 725, 20 S.
C. R. 633.
' Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, (1901) 183 U. S. 13, 46 L. Ed. 55,
22 S. C. R. 1.
72 Booth v. Illinois, (1902) 184 U. S. 425, 46 L. Ed. 623, 22 S. C. R.
425.
7T Muller v. Oregon, (1908) 208 U. S. 412, 52 L. Ed. 551, 28 S, C. R.
324.74 Clark v. Nash, (1905) 198 U. S. 361, 49 L. Ed. 1085, 25 S. C. R.
676.
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ing it unlawful to contract to pay miners employed in quantity
rates on the basis of screened coal instead of the weight of coal as
originally produced at the mine;"5 prohibiting contracts limiting
liability for injuries made in advance of injuries received ;76 regu-
lating the rates to be charged for fire insurance;77 requiring cer-
tain industries including railroads to pay employees semi-monthly
in cash ;"' fixing a minimum wage for women and minors ;7' and
prohibiting the sale of stocks without a license granted by a "blue
sky commission."80' In all these cases there was a limitation of
contract in the interest of the general welfare and, therefore, not
an infringement of the fourteenth amendment. Upholding'the
power of the legislature to enact such legislation Justice Hughes
said :81
"But where there is reasonable relation to an object within the
governmental authority the exercise of the legislative discretion
is not subject to judicial review. The scope of judicial inquiry in
deciding the question of power is not to be confused with the
scope of legislative consideration dealing with the matter of
policy."
The same principle is thus stated by Justice Day in McLean v.
Arkansas :82 "The legislature, being familiar with local conditions
is primarily the judge of the necessity of such enactments."
Again, those upholding the constitutionality of the present
Kansas act rely to a considerable extent on the dissenting opin-
ions in the Adair and Coppage cases. In the Adair case Justice
McKenna pointed out that labor unions sustain a very important
relation to common carriers, a matter of public concern; there-
fore, their power should be recognized in legislation. Justice
Holmes emphasized the same point and said:
"Their very existence is directed specifically to the business,
and their connection with it is, at least, as intimate and important
75McLean v. Arkansas, (1919) 211 U. S. 539, 53 L. Ed. 315, 29 S.
C. R. 206.76 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. McGuire, (1916) 219 U. S. 549, 55 L. Ed. 328.
, German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, (1913) 233 U. S. 389, 58 L. Ed.
1011, 34 S. C. R. 612.
78 Erie R. R. Co. v. Williams, (1914) 233 U. S. 685, 58 L. Ed. 1155,
34 S. C. R. 761.
79Stettler v. O'Hara, (1914) 69 Ore. 519, 139 Pac. 743; Williams v.
Evans, (1917) 139 Minn. 32, 165 N. W. 495.
80 Hall v. Giegner-Jones Co., (1917) 242 U. S. 539, 61 L. Ed. 480,
37 S. C. R. 217.
81 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. McGuire, (1916) 219 U. S. 549. 55 L.
Ed. 328.
82McLean v. Arkansas, (1919) 211 U. S. 539, 53 L. Ed. 315, 29 S.
C. R. 206.
83 Adair v. -United States, (1908) 208 U. S. 161, 52 L. Ed. 436, 28 S.
C. R. 277, 13 Ann. Cas. 764.
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as that of safety couplers, and, I should think, as the liability of
master and servant, matters which, it is admitted, Congress might
regulate so far as they concern commerce among the states."
Justice Holmes dissented in the Coppage case reiterating his for-
mer attitude and urging that the Adair decision be overruled.
Justice Day with Justice Hughes concurring, argued strongly in
favor of upholding the Kansas act as a proper limitation of the
contract under the reserved police power of the state.8 4
The chief reliance of the proponents of the Kansas act is the
so-called Adamson law, passed by Congress in 1916 to prevent a
nation-wide strike by the railway labor unions. This law did three
things: (1) It established eight hours as the staiidard work day
for employees of interstate commerce carriers; (2) provided for
a commission of three to observe the operation of the law for a
period of not less than six nor more than nine months and then
report to the president and Congress; (3) provided that until a
report of the commission should be made and for thirty days,
thereafter, the wages of railway employees should be the present
standard day's wage and for extra time the employees should be
paid not less than the pro rata rate for the standard eight-hour
day. In other words, Congress compulsorily arbitrated a dispute
between railway employers and their employees and fixed a tem-
porary minimum wage pending an agreement between the em-
ployers and their employees. The constitutionality of this act was
upheld by a divided court in the case of Wilson v. New,8" Chief
Justice White delivering the opinion. The Chief Justice in the
course of the opinion, surveyed the situation in the fall of 1916
when the imminent interruption of interstate commerce was
threatened by a general strike of railway employees. The strike,
if called just at the approach of winter, would have been a na-
tional calamity. The threatened strike was the outcome of a dis-
pute over a standard work day and an adequate wage scale. The
Chief Justice then inquired as to the power of Congress over
interstate and foreign commerce in the face of an emergency,
which in his opinion, did not create a power in Congress, but
furnished a reason for the exercise of a power already enjoyed, 6
and said:
"That the business of common carriers by railroads is in a
sense a public business because of the interest of society in the
84 Coppage v. Kansas, (1914) 236 U. S. 1, 59 L. Ed. 441, 35 S. C. R.
240.85 (1917) 243 U. S. 332, 61 L. Ed. 755, 37 S. C. R. 298.
86 See Ex parte Milligan, (1866) 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. Ed. 387.
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continued operation and rightful conduct of such business, and
that the public interest begets a public right of regulation to the
full extent necessary to secure and protect it, is settled by so many
decisions, state and federal, and is illustrated by such a continu-
ous exertion of state and federal legislative power, as to require
no room for question on this subject."
Touching the private nature of the right of the parties concerned
to fix wages and the superior public right vested in Congress in
case of failure to exercise what he called an essentially private
right he said:
"It is also equally true that as the right to fix, by agreement
between the carrier and its employees, a standard of wages to con-
trol their relations is primarily private, the establishment and giv-
ing effect to such agreed on standards is not subject to be con-
trolled or prevented by public authority. By taking all these propo-
sitions as undoubted, if the situation which we have described
and with which the act of Congress dealt be taken into view, that
is, the dispute between the employers and employees as to a
standard of wages, their failure to agree, the resulting absence of
such standard, the entire interruption of interstate commerce
which was threatened, and the infinite injury to the public inter-
est,.which was imminent, it would seem inevitably to result that
the power to regulate necessarily obtained and was subject to
be applied to the extent necessary to provide a remedy for the
situation, which included a power to deal with a dispute, to provide
by appropriate action for a standard of wages, to fill the want of
one caused by the failure to exert the private right on the subject,
and to give effect by appropriate legislation to the regulations thus
adopted."
The court upheld the constitutionality of the Adamson act
because (1) a great emergency confronted the country, an emer-
gency occasioned by a dispute between employers and employees
in interstate commerce; (2) interstate commerce is a business
affected with a public interest; (3) therefore, Congress, having
full power over interstate commerce, has the right to regulate it
for the preservation of a superior public right to the extent of
fixing a standard work day and a temporary minimum wage. It
is claimed that the Kansas act is "on all fours" with the Adamson
act in that each provides compulsory arbitration and each fixes
a temporary minimum wage pending the settlement of a dispute
between employers and employees in a business affected with a
public interest; but it should be noted that the Wilson case had to
do with a common carrier and no prohibition of strikes; the
Howat case, with a coal-mining industry and a prohibition of
strikes.
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Justice Curran of the Crawford County district court render-
ing the decision in the Howat case17 showed that the coal mining
industry is subject to the supervision of a state official, namely,
the state mining inspector, which makes the industry a matter of
public interest; that the act of the Kansas legislature, in the cir-
cumstances, specifically affecting the coal mining industry with a
public interest is conclusive upon the court. Justice Curran fol-
lowed the example of Chief Justice White in the Wilson case and
took judicial notice of the emergency that induced the Kinsas
legislature to pass the act creating the Kansas court of industrial
relations to settle industrial disputes, and said:
"If I am at liberty to do that, what were the conditions that
confronted the people of our state during the time referred to by
counsel, that is, of December, 1919? We find the state, by reason
of being deprived of fuel, in a paralyzed condition in practically
all of its industries. The streets of cities were dark; the schools
were closed and the education of children was interfered with;
the unfortunates confined in the hospitals for the insane threat-
ened with the hazard of freezing. We find the school for the
feeble-minded in the same condition. The hospitals that dot the
state of Kansas, where the sick, the weak, the crippled, the
maimed and helpless were confined, threatened with the hazard of
freezing for want of fuel; the school for the deaf and dumb, the
school for the blind and helpless, and every institution in the
state threatened and doubly threatened; transportation paralyzed;
the means of distribution of food and other necessaries of life
did not properly function as a result of not having fuel; and
whenever you paralyze transportation you make a strong bid for
starvation and suffering.' 8s
Continuing, the court pointed out that the act does not provide for
a general but only a temporary regulation of the coal business
as the court of industrial relations does not begin -to function until
there is a controversy that threatens the public safety; and when
the dispute is settled the regulation by the court ceases. The act,
in the opinion of the court, is a reasonable police power regulation
and therefore, constitutional.
The contention of Justice Curran to the effect that the court
of industrial relations does not begin to function until there is a
controversy between employers and employees in the industries
affected with a public interest and consequently there is no general
87 See note 52; see also Titus v. Sherwood, (1910) 81 Kan. 780,
106 Pac. 1071; In re Williams, (1908) 79 Kan. 212, 98 Pac. 777; State
v. Reasor, (1915) 93 Kan. 628; Pac.; State v. Booth, (1913) 179 Ind.
405, 100 N. E. 563.11 See note 52.
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but merely a temporary regulation, seems to be well taken. An
examination of this act confirms Justice Curran's position. Sec-
tion 3 declares the "operation" of the specified industries to be
affected with a public interest. It is "operation" and not property
that is affected. Section 7 states the circumstances under which
the court of industrial relations may take jurisdiction over a
"controversy" between employers and employees in the specified
industries. It is clear that no jurisdiction is conferred unless
"It 'shall appear to said court of industrial relations that said
controversy may endanger the continuity or efficiency of service
. . . or affect the production or transportation of the neces-
saries of life . . . or produce industrial strife, disorder or
waste, or endanger the orderly operation of such industries . . .
and thereby endanger the public peace or threaten the public
health."
Section 8 defines the kind of order the court may make and pro:
vides:
"Such terms, conditions, rules, practices, wages or standard of
wages . . . shall continue for such reasonable time as may
be fixed by the court, or until changed by the agreement of the
parties with the approval of the court."
It is not reasonable to assume that the court would refuse to
revoke its order when the disputants agree, unless such agree-
ment would impair a public right. Section 9 provides:
"The right of every person to make his own choice of employment
and to make and carry out fair, just and reasonable contracts -and
agreements of employments is hereby recognized."
Section 17 permits an individual to quit his employment at any
time; but prohibits him from quitting by the strike method for
the purpose of "hindering, delaying, interfering with, or sus-
pending the operation of" any of the specified industries. Again,
"operation" is the keyword.
Is it not dear that these sections provide no general regulation
of the specified industries? The court can act, only, in case of a
dispute or controversy which creates a danger to the public peace
or public health, or the general welfare. After the court acts to
prevent a breach of the peace, or danger to the public health, the
law provides that the emergency having passed, in other words,
the disputing employers and employees having agreed and the
agreement being reasonable, it must set aside the order and the
industry returns to its normal conditions. When the industrial
ship approaches dangerous breakers or stormy seas in the form
of unsettled controversies, and, the owners, the crew and the
passengers-the employer, employees and the public-are
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threatened with a wreck, an impartial expert pilot, the court of
industrial relations, takes the wheel temporarily; and when the
danger is passed the" regular pilot resumes the wheel and the ship
continues on its regular course. No attempt is made to impose
upon the manufacture of food and clothing and the production of
fuel the fixing of charges and the regulation of service similar to
the general regulation of public utilities and common carriers.
In these three industries such temporary regulation, only, is im-
posed as is absolutely necessary to preserve the peace, protect the
health and promote the general welfare.
No case involving the manufacture of food or clothing has
come before any of the regular courts of Kansas, but a hearing
of a milling case 89 has just been concluded by the court of indus-
trial relations. This was an investigation coming under the pro-
visions of the Kansas act touching the manufacture of food
products to determine whether the flour mills are reducing produc-
tion to "affect prices," or to obstruct the reasonable continuity and
efficiency of production of flour and thus endanger the public
peace, health and general welfare. The milling industry is one
that by section 16 of the act cannot reduce production without the
consent of the court of industrial relations. The decision, written
by Judge Huggins, stated that the evidence showed a condition
exactly opposite from that occupied by the coal mining industry a
year ago as the flour storage capacity of the mills at the present
time is full to the limit. Elevators are full of wheat, no shortage
of flour anywhere in the state, prices falling and foreign orders
for flour diminishing because of foreign market and exchange
conditions. The court found that the milling industry is one of
the essential industries in the" sense of the Kansas statute and,
therefore, subject to the court's regulations to protect the public
interest. The court did not issue a regulating order but appointed
Mr. G. A. Engh, the chief accountant of the court; Professor
L. A. Fitz, head of the milling department of the Kansas Agricul-
tural College, and C. V. Topping, Secretary of the Southwest
Millers Association, a committee to recommend to the court rules
for the operation of the industry and keep the court informed as
to continuity and efficiency of operation.
s8 Printed transcript. Docket No. 3, 803. In the court of industrial
relations, state of Kansas.
In the matter of the investigation concerning the continuity of pro-
duction in the flour-milling industry at Topeka and other points in the
state of Kansas.
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Touching the interest of labor in this matter, the opinion con-
tains two significant paragraphs as follows:
"Another very important question connected with the matter
before us is its effect upon labor. As has already been stated,
herein, the people of Kansas have solemnly declared by legislative
act that workers engaged in this industry shall, at all times, receive
a fair wage and have healthful and moral surroundings. In the
reduction of hours of operation, therefore, the millers should be
very careful and solicitous concerning the matter of labor. Skilled
and faithful employees should be given such treatment as will
enable them during the period of limited production to support
themselves and families. The evidence, before us shows that in the
Topeka mills skilled men in the milling business are being paid a
monthly wage and are, therefore, drawing pay whether the mill
is running or not. So far as it is possible to do so this rule should
be recognized in all the mills of the state, for it is necessary in the
promotion of the general welfare that skilled and faithful workers
should always be available for these essential industries which so
vitally affect the living conditions of the people."
This is not an order, but if the suggestion is carried out or an
order is finally made embodying this principle, may it not in .time
"take property without due process of law ?"
There is one drastic provision in the Kansas act affecting the
control of business which amounts to temporary state socialism.
Section 20 provides that in case of suspension, limitation or cessa-
tion of the operation of the specified industries, etc., contrary to
the provisions of the act or the orders of the court of industrial
relations, and said court is satisfied, that the suspension, etc.,
affects the general welfare by endangering the public peace'or
threatening the public health, the court of industrial relations may
take proper proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction to
take over and operate the said industry, etc., during such an
emergency. There is a proviso that owners of the industry must
have a fair return and the employees a fair wage during the time
of such operation. This reads well. But it might happen that
state operation would not yield a net return in the face of supply
and demand and the inexorable conditions of world markets suffi-
cient to pay a fair retwrn to the owners and a fair wage to the
workers. Would this not be a taking of property without "due
process" of law? Would the state in the circumstances retreat
from the cover of the police power and resort to taxation to make
up the deficiency so that the owners might have a fair return and
the workers a fair wage? Would the state insist on the discourag-
ing police power principle for a business affected by a public
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interest that Justice Holmes announced in the case of Noble State
Bank v. Haskell?"° The Justice replying to the charge that taking
the funds of one bank to create a guaranty fund to pay depositors
in a failed bank is taking property without "due process" of law,
said:
"For in this case there is no out. and out taking at all. The pay-
ment can be avoided by going out of the banking business, and is
required only as a condition for keeping on, for corporations
created by the state."
Would the state rest its case on the principle of the North
Dakota industrial program which was recently held constitutional
by the Supreme Court in the case of Green v. Frazier?91 Justice
Day speaking for the court said:
"Under the peculiar conditions existing in North Dakota which
are emphasized by the opinion of its highest court, if the state
sees fit to enter upon such enterprises as are herein involved with
the sanction of its constitution, its legislature and its people, we
are not prepared to say that it is within the authority of this
court in enforcing the observance of the fourteenth amendment,
to set aside such action by judicial decision."
This case involved a question of state taxation and "due process"
of law.
Briefly summarizing this article it may be said that the orig-
inal principle of affecting an industry or business with a public
interest rested on either special privileges granted by the state
or on a monopoly, real or virtual. These still play an important
role but are not conclusive at the present time. The common law
has been augmented by statutes to include many industries that
formerly were regarded as private. The justification for these
additions is the changed social and economic conditions which
call for a new interpretation of the public interest and the place
of the individual in a complex social, political and economic organ-
ization. Despite the arguments of able judges who pleaded the
90 (1911) 219 U. S. 575, 55 L. Ed. 341, 31 S. C. R. 299. The court
of appeals for the District of Columbia recently held unconstitutional
an act of Congress declaring rental property such as apartments andhotels affected with a public interest, and giving tenants the right to
occupy the premises after the termination of the lease, the rental to befixed by a rent commission. This act known as the Ball Rent Law, the
court said, infringed the fifth amendment by taking property without
"due process" of law. There was a vigorous dissent by Chief JuiticeSmyth who argued that renting apartments can be affected with a publicinterest and regulated under the police power, using the principles of
the Munn, Budd, McGuire and the German Alliance Ins. Co. cases. SeeHirsh v. Block, (1920) 267 Fed. 614.
91 (1920) 40 S. C. R. 499.
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private nature -of the business and the principle of competition as
a sufficient regulator, the legislatures have widened the horizon
of the police power in the interest of the general welfare which
has constantly waxed as the individual welfare, as formerly un-
derstood, has waned. The individual may conduct his business
unmolested as long as he does .not injure others, but the state
decides when the individual activity threatens to impinge upon
the public welfare.
The Kansas act was passed in the face of a great emergency.
In order to get the strongest possible excuse for regulation the
act affects several industries, etc., with a public interest, namely,
public utilities, common carriers and three industries that deal
with the necessaries of life-manufacture of food and clothing
and the mining or production of fuel including the transportation
of these three. The act has several interesting features in the
difference of treatment accorded these three industries. The
regulation of the manufacture of food products seems to be un-
restricted but the regulation applied to the manufacture of cloth-
ing and the production of food applies only to these two articles
in "common use." What is "common use?" Again instead of fol-
lowing the usual practice of classifying the industries on the basis
of size and therefore the assumed probable danger the act makes
no distinction between the small and the large industries within
each class, that is, the aggregate units of the separate industries
furnish the public interest or test which is but following the
method whose constitutionality was upheld in the German Alli-
ance Insurance Company case. 2 Finally the act is interesting in
that the court of industrial relations, for the three special indus-
tries affected, exercises no general regulation of the business but
only a temporary, regulation restricted to the "operation" of the
industry during the peroid of a controversy or public danger.
Sections 15 and 17 have been the storm centers of opposition
to the act.93 Section 15, which makes it unlawful for any person
to discharge or discriminate against an employee because of his
testifying before or complaining to the court of industrial rela-
tions touching a controversy between employers and employees
as provided for in the law, seems to fall under the condemnation
92 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, (1913) 233 U. S. 389, 58 L. Ed.
1011, 34 S. C. R. 612.
93 Section 17 will receive further treatment in the concluding article
of this series.
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of the Supreme Court's decision in the Coppage case." Two views
may be advanced in support of the constitutionality of this section:
first, the general theory of the Supreme Court which pervades
the decision of Wilson v. New, together with the strong dissents
in the Adair and Coppage cases, may indicate that the highest
court in the United States is ready to reverse its decisions in the
last two cases and thus bring them into harmony with other deci-
sions by the Supreme Court approving sweeping limitations of
the right to contract; second, the industries to which the limita-
tion applies, unlike the legislative act condemned in the Coppage
case, have been affected with a public interest and section 15 is
incorporated as necessary in the enforcement of a police power
regulation. In other words, the section is introduced to prohibit
employers from intimidating employees who might be necessary
witnesses before the court or who might properly sign a com-
plaint.
In view of the judicial attitude toward the evolving or dyna-
mic police power, it would seem that this Kansas act, at least as
far as the sections already discussed are involved, has more than
an even chance of being held constitutional; but it would take
the cube of Solomon's wisdom to predict what the Supreme
Court of the United States will do with a police power statute
and the "due process" and "equal protection" clauses of the
federal constitution.
(To be conchded.)
94 Coppage v. Kansas, (1914) 236 U. S. 1, 59 L. Ed. 441, 35 S. C. R.
240.
